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ABSTRACT: 
In this research, I investigated the determinants of demand for credit and consumption of credits 
among small farmers of district Mandi Bahauddin, Pakistan. 
For this purpose, I interviewed 123 households of six villages of this district. Both qualitative 
and quantitative techniques were employed to examine factors that affect demand for credits. 
Seven hypotheses were devised and tested and probit and OLS models were used to analyze the 
effects of education, household size and income on demand for credit. For sake of clear 
understanding, income variable was further decomposed into three types of income i.e. livestock 
income, agricultural production income and other sources of income. 
I found that informal borrowing (from friends and relatives), higher interest rate and high 
transaction costs crowded out formal lending. However, consumption smoothing was not a major 
reason for demand for formal loans. A positive correlation was found between education and 
demand for credit. Household size and all types of incomes did not significantly correlate with 
demand for credit. Moreover, being residents of villages Lakhnewala and Badshahpur showed 
higher probability of demand for credit than being resident of Kangsahali, whereas being 
residents of Shahidanwali, Wara Alam Shah and Chak Abdullah did not affect demand for credit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: credit demand, credit consumption, probit, interest rate, education, household size, 
income, Mandi Bahauddin, Pakistan. 
3 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: 
A light purse is a heavy curse. People living in rural areas of Pakistan are very familiar with this 
saying. These are people mostly having small lands and fewer opportunities to earn livelihoods. 
Pakistan has population of 182.1 million, of which 63 percent live in rural areas (World Bank 
2013). Poverty incidence is higher in rural areas than in urban areas since rural households rely 
mostly on agriculture as their main source of income (Akhtar 2012). More than one billion 
people globally live in a household with per capita incomes of less than $ 1.25 per day (World 
Bank 2010). The policymakers and others trying to improve the lives of this one billion are 
having a hard time. The main aim of microcredit programs is to help people overcome financial 
constraints. Households with access to credit are often more able to increase their income and 
food consumption than those who do not have access to credit (Sharma and Zeller 1998). 
1.1 Importance of Microcredit: 
The federal and provincial governments of Pakistan and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) are responsible for credit disbursement to support small farmers by providing financial 
services. Among small and big financial institutions, the most prominent are ZTBL (Zarai 
Taraqiati Bank Limited), BoP (Bank of Punjab), and NBP (National Bank of Pakistan) and 
among NGOs the most prominent are AKRSP (Agha Khan Rural Support Program), NRSP 
(National Rural Support Program) and OPP (Orangi Pilot Project). Considerable amounts of 
research have compared incomes and overall living standards of borrowers and non-borrowers in 
different areas of Pakistan. Some of these showed positive signs of improvement in living 
standards.  For instance, micro credit significantly improved households’ income (Waheed 
2009). Similarly, institutional credits in Pakistan not only effect determinants of the agricultural 
output, but also effect household consumption and other household welfare indicators (Khandker 
and Faruqee 1999). Credit disbursements by PPAF (Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund) 
decreased the poverty level of borrowers from 6.61% to 3.07% (Ali and Alam 2010). 
1.2 Demand for Credit: 
The effectiveness of microcredits among small farmers depends on demand and supply of 
microcredits. The scope of this study is limited to the demand side of microcredits in Mandi 
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Bahauddin (M.B.Din) district. It is a plain area situated in the heart of Pakistan and very suitable 
for agricultural production. This district is enriched with vast irrigation facilities as bounded by 
the country’s two big rivers i.e. Chenab and Jhelum. For this reason, it was named Mandi 
Bahauddin (or Market Bahauddin) after establishment of a grain market in the early 20th century 
(District Courts, 2011). Along with geographic reason, other important factor behind choosing 
this district for study is high concentration of small farmers living in this area. The majority of 
farmers own less than 13 acres of land.  
Demand for credits depends on many factors such as education, households’ size, interest rate, 
collateral, assets, households’ income and so forth. For instance, interest rates charged on the 
microcredit loans were higher than other loans (Fernando 2006). This happened because the 
credit services provided were for small sums of money and the administrative costs of these 
small loans made the interest rates high. The distance from the rural borrower to the bank, was a 
major determinant affecting access to credit (Bakhshoodeh and Karami 2008). A positive 
correlation was found between demand for credit and family size (Shah et al. 2008). Group based 
lending also released needs for collateral for households that had previously limited access to 
loans from conventional commercial banks (Kausar 2013). 
 
1.3 Objective of Study: 
The objective of this study is to identify important factors in decision making of small farmers of 
Mandi Bahauddin regarding microcredits. For this purpose I conducted interviews with farmers 
in different villages to find answers to the following primary and secondary questions: 
 What are the determinants of demand for credits among small farmers? 
This is basically a comparison between farmers who had never applied for any type of formal 
loan and farmers who had got such loans. 
 How do the farmers use the loans - for consumption smoothing or for production 
activities? 
Consumption purposes could be expenditures on marriage, renovation of house, repayment for 
formal or informal loan etc. Examples of production activities are: purchase of any agricultural 
inputs and machinery and other small business purchases. 
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Based on these research questions and respective literature review, I develop different research 
hypotheses in chapter 3. These hypotheses will be tested using the data I collected. 
1.4 Structure of Thesis: 
The next chapter gives background information about Pakistan and its district Mandi Bahauddin 
in particular. In the same chapter I also discuss the history of microfinance in Pakistan.  
In chapter 3, I discuss previous studies on demand for credits in other parts of the world. Based 
on this literature review, I develop seven different hypotheses.  
 
Chapter 4 is comprised of two main parts i.e. research strategy and econometric and statistical 
models.  
 
The research questions and hypotheses will be analyzed and discussed thoroughly in chapter 5. 
This chapter will mainly comprise of two parts i.e. descriptive and quantitative analysis. 
 
Chapter 6 is the conclusion of the study. 
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2. BACKGROUND: 
 
Figure1. Map of Pakistan    Figure2. Map of District Mandi Bahauddin. 
2.1 Description of Mandi Bahauddin (M.B.Din): 
Pakistan is one of the developing countries of South Asia, which got independence on 14th 
August, 1947 from British India. Bordering India on the east, Afghanistan on the west, China on 
the north and Iran on the south-western side, making its geo-political importance inevitable as 
shown in figure 1. District Mandi Bahauddin is one of the 34 districts of the Punjab province. 
Other provinces are Sindh, Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The estimated population of 
the district is 1.41 million (Punjab Bureau of Statistics 2013). The Federal government has not 
conducted national census since 1998. It is bounded on the north-west by the river Jhelum, on the 
south-east by the river Chenab which separates it from District Gujranwala and Gujrat and on the 
south west by District Sargodha as shown in figure2. Tehsil Malalwal, Phalia and Mandi 
Bahauddin divide it administrative and territorially, which are further divided into 65 Union 
Councils. Major characteristics are shown below in the table.1. 
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Table1. Important figures 
Population 1.41 million 
Population growth 1.87% 
Area 2673 sq. km 
Number of Tehsils 3 
Number of Union Councils 65 
Population density (pop. per sq. km) 530 
Literacy rate (above 10 years old) 65% 
Unemployment 7.8% 
Mean Household size 6.4 
Members working outside 
village/town/overseas 
25.9% 
Agricultural land-owners household percentage 45.7% 
Percentage of households receiving remittances 
from abroad 
12.8% 
Cultivated area 226000 Hectares 
Main crops Wheat, sugarcane and rice 
Average rain fall 50cm 
Percentage of households possessing bank 
accounts 
24.1% 
Sources: Bureau of Statistics, Punjab (2011&2013) & Directorate of Industries, Punjab (2009) 
Being an agriculture-dominant economy of Pakistan, the majority of the population in the district 
is also involved in agriculture. Agricultural workers are around 40.7 per cent, elementary 
occupations (laborers, helpers, street vendors etc.) 40 per cent; service workers 6.5 per cent, 
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crafts and related trade 4.2 per cent; professionals 3.1 per cent and machine operators 2.4 per 
cent (District Courts, 2011). 
2.2 Study Areas: 
The reasons for selecting this district is that majority of the farmers are small farmers. The 
interviews have been conducted from 6 villages of all three Tehsils and from each tehsil 2 
villages were selected. Villages were selected in such a way that no corner of the district should 
be left unattended. Names of villages are Lakhnewala and Shahidanwali from Tehsil M.B.Din; 
Wara Alam Shah and Badshahpur from Tehsil Malakwal; and Chak Abdullah and Kang Sahali 
from Tehsil Phalia. 
2.3 Microfinance Evolution in Pakistan: 
Agricultural credit concept is not new, but rather dates back to early 1960s when Agricultural 
Development Bank (now ZTBL) was established (in 1961) by federal government to meet credit 
needs of rural areas of Pakistan. Like other agricultural  banks, ZTBL also faced many losses due 
to low rates of lending and political lending which resulted in major write offs (Ahmad 2008). In 
1982, the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) was developed to lend Karachi urban slums by targeting 
small entrepreneurs. In the same year, the Aga Khan Rural Support Program (AKRSP) launched 
its credit operations in the North. In 1990s, the model of AKRSP was implemented in the whole 
country with the establishment of National Rural Support Program (NRSP) and the Sarhad Rural 
Support Program (SRSP). These institutions were the general support institutions that provided a 
wide range of social services, including financial services. Financial services provided to the 
poor were often socially driven and were highly subsidized and little efforts were made to 
recover delinquent loans (Shah et al. 2008). To address these shortcomings in 1996 the RSPs 
established specialized microfinance NGO called as Kashf Foundation. In 1998, this precursor of 
the Pakistan Microfinance Network (PMN) began to play a role in representing emerging Micro 
Finance Providers (MFPs). Further developments followed in 2000, when the Pakistan Poverty 
Alleviation Fund (PPAF) made its first loan to MFPs, and SBP opened a microfinance unit. In 
2001, the government of Pakistan (GoP) helped to create a major retail institution, the Khushhali 
Bank, dedicated to serve the poor (Ahmad 2008). 
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In 2001, Microfinance Institutions Ordinance (MFI) was issued to regulate the operations of 
Microfinance institutions. Ordinance states that micro-loan cannot exceed Rs. 100,000 and 
microfinance client income must be below the taxable amount. This was to assure the focus of 
MFIs must remain with the poor target market (Ghalib 2010). 
Other private NGOs belonging to the so-called ‘civil society’ emerged in 1990s. These multi-
sector NGOs are working on the lines of RSPs with interest in microfinance, such as Sungi 
Foundation, SAFWCO, Taraqi Foundation and DAMEN. These NGOs, as champions of socio-
economic development goals, engaged in microfinance from a pure poverty alleviation 
philosophy and did not include the financial system (FS) (Khan 2011). 
A brief timeline of emergence of MFIs is as followed: 
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           Source: (Ghalib, 2010). 
 
3. REVIEW OF LITERATURE: 
This chapter discusses different factors that affect three types of lending i.e. micro-lending, other 
formal lending and informal lending, mentioned in different studies of the world. Micro-lending 
is a very small loan given to poor people for helping them to be self-employed (Fernando 2006).  
Poor people receive such loans to increase their living standard by investing in income 
generating activities. Commercial banks are the main sources of other formal financial services. 
Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited (formerly known as Agricultural Development Bank Ltd) was 
established to serve such financial services to farmers only. Informal lenders are friends, 
relatives, local traders, shopkeepers etc. This chapter will also discuss studies about relationship 
between demand for loans and consumption smoothing. 
3.1 Factors Affecting Credit-demand: 
3.1.1 Effects of interest rates: 
Among the determinants of demand for loan, the interest rate carries much weight with respect to 
importance. Higher interest rates decreased the probability of borrowing from formal credit 
markets in China and this negative effect was statistically significant (Tang et al. 2010). Interest 
rates are high due to high microcredit program running costs (Nawai 2010). In an Asian 
Development Bank report about interest rates on microcredit in Asia and Pacific regions, it was 
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argued that the interest rates charged on the microcredit loans was higher than other loans. This 
happened because the credit services provided were for small sums of money and the cost of 
these small loans made the interest on them very high. Furthermore, mostly the microfinance 
lending institutions in the region charged the nominal interest rate from 30-70% a year. For 
instance, Microcredit Regulatory Authority (MRA), Bangladesh, has fixed interest rate of 27% 
and Dhaka Bank limited offer personal loam at 18%. Other factors that affect the interest rate 
were; the repayment frequency of loans; systems used for collecting the repayment; and the 
necessary deposit required for getting the loan.  All these factors raised the effective rate of 
interest (Fernando 2006). 
Holding other factors  constant,  the  higher  the  interest  rate  charged,  the lower  the  demand  
for  credit. This is  a  plausible assumption because at high interest rates, the returns from an 
activity must be high  enough  to enable the  investor  to  retain a profit  after paying the  loan 
plus the  interest (Mpuga 2004). A percentage change in a given interest rate is met by nearly the 
same percentage change in the quantity demanded (Salazar et al. 2010). The main reasons that 
discourage the respondents include high interest rate, inability to repay the loan from high 
interest rate and shocks faced from drought, illness, long waiting time and others (Ferede 2012). 
As a contrast to the above results, Balogun and Yusuf (2011) found, in South-Western states of 
Nigeria, that irrespective of distance or interest rate, households would pursue credit, because of 
their dire need and shortage in supply, in the case formal lending but found negative relationship 
between interest rate and demand for credit in case of informal lending. Dehejia et al. (2007) 
argued that higher interest rate on one hand would improve the financial permanence of 
microfinance organizations. However, on the other hand, their results also supported those who 
argue that the poor, and particularly the poorest, do consider prices and reduced loan demand 
accordingly. 
Based on this, I expect to find interest rate as one of the driving forces that discourages farmers 
to apply for such loans. 
Other factors that could influence the demand for loans among small farmers are religious 
restriction, households’ characteristics (size, age, education, occupation etc.), no or limited 
knowledge of loans schemes, transaction cost, income, total value of assets, formal borrowing 
procedure and payback failure fear and informal lending. 
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3.1.2 Religion: 
No doubt, according to Islam, God has forbidden to give loans based on interest.  To make 
profits from giving loans is moral corruption. In the Holy Quran, Allah (God) says that “Those 
who consume interest cannot stand [on the Day of Resurrection] except as one stands who is 
being beaten by Satan into insanity. That is because they say, "Trade is [just] like interest." But 
Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden interest. So whoever has received an admonition 
from his Lord and desists may have what is past, and his affair rests with Allah. But whoever 
returns to [dealing in interest or usury] - those are the companions of the Fire; they will abide 
eternally therein.” (Holy Quran: Chapter 2: Verse 275). 
It is generally thought that paying interest too is prohibited in the same manner as consuming 
interest is. In reality, there is no basis of this opinion in the Quran and Hadith. Not at one place 
has the Quran condemned people who pay interest; it has, in fact, regarded them to be the 
oppressed; it has also urged the lenders to give respite to such borrowers if they are facing some 
financial constraint (Ghamdi 2009). 
 Moreover, in Pakistan a researcher used ‘profit’ word instead of ‘interest’ in an effort to make 
interest more acceptable to rural people but, even then, 39% of the respondents believed that this 
kind of ‘profit’ was not allowed according to Islam. Conventional banking systems (including MFIs) 
offer only interest-based saving accounts; there is no inherent incentive for this segment of the 
population to have saving accounts in banks at all (Akhtar 2012). Similarly, in Ethiopia, a negative 
relationship was found between demand for microcredit and religion in case of Muslims (Frede 
2012). 
3.1.3 Households’ Characteristics: 
Size of household: It is plausible to say that increasing household size would increase demand 
for credit due to higher overall consumption and investment demands. But on the other hand, a 
big family also means having more earning people in the household. This would decrease 
demand for credit in such case. The demand for credit was significantly affected by household's 
production capacity as supported by the fact that household size, agricultural land, and head's 
education all significantly increased households’ probability to borrow (Tang et al. 2010). 
Similarly, in case of bigger families, demand for credit got raised (Shah et al. 2008). To the 
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contrary, Cheng (2006), in China, found an insignificant effect of the large family on demand for 
micro-loans.  
Unlike Cheng (2006), I  expect that household size might play an important role in case of 
Pakistan. Because for large family sizes, head of the households have to take loan for education 
and marriage purposes of their children, at least. Their income from farming might not be 
sufficient to bear costs of enrolling children in better private schools and to spend considerable 
sums of money on marriages to follow general customs of the society. 
Age: According to the life cycle theory (Life Cycle Hypothesis), individuals smooth 
consumption over their life-cycle by borrowing when young, saving when in middle age and 
running down their assets in old age and at death (Modigliani 1966). In line with this theory, loan 
amount of household was positively correlated with the age at younger age, in the case of Greek 
households’ demand for loans. In particular, the loan amount reached a maximum at 42 years of 
age. The loan amount decreased in case respondents were over 42 years old (Pastrapa and 
Apostolopoulos 2014). 
Similarly, in case of the US, the persons aged between 20 and 30 were more passionate. They 
continued taking on risk and hence experienced rapid increase in earnings. These energetic 
households actively took more part in borrowing programs than elder people (Lehnert 2004). 
Those at the medium age had positive and significant demand while the old were less inclined to 
demand for credit (Mpuga 2008).  
I expect that age will have a significant effect on demand for credits among farmers and that 
middle age people would be demanding more than old people, as found in above studies. 
Education: Education is an important variable affecting households demand for credit, one 
additional year of education by head of household increased the probability of borrowing by 
another 2.5 percent. However, the impact of education was not the same for formal or informal 
institutions. For example, while the level of education increased households’ probability to 
borrow from formal credit markets, it decreased or did not affect the informal credit demand at 
all (Tang et al. 2010). In addition, education at primary and secondary level may affect 
positively, but at four-year university level, education has a negative, but insignificant effect. 
This could imply that highly educated individuals already enjoy high income and wealth and 
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have little need to borrow (Chen and Chiivakul 2008). Better‐educated heads are likely to use 
credit from formal financial services (Bendig et al. 2009). Similarly, based on a household 
survey in Madagascar, the probability of applying for credit significantly increased with the 
number of years of schooling (Zeller 1994). Being socially and culturally different from 
Madagascar, in case of Pakistan, low literacy created problems in acquiring formal loans and use 
of such loans in more productive way (Waheed 2001). 
Indeed education is another important demand side factor that might influence access to credit 
since educated individuals can better understand the loan regulations as well as the borrowing 
procedures of the formal financial institutions and thereby reduce costs of gathering information.  
3.1.4 Income and assets: 
At the household level, the level of income is an important factor that would determine the 
demand for financial services. The total revenue and acreage had positive effects on credit 
accessibility among farmers in Kohgiloieh-Bovirahmad province in southern Iran. By increasing 
total revenue and acreage, ability of farmers in providing collateral and costs of receiving credit 
increased and therefore probability of access to credit increased too (Bakhshoodeh and Karami 
2008). Moreover, doubling land endowment increased the probability of borrowing by 5.6 
percent (Tang et al. 2010). A similar effect was observed on probability of applying for credit, 
when income of the households was increased (Zeller (1994). 
In six provinces of Indonesia, the probability of borrowing rose steadily from 14 percent for poor 
households with per capita income up to three times the poverty line. They used 36 cents per day 
in rural areas as a benchmark for poverty line (Johnston and Morduch 2007). In case of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the relationship between net wealth and probability of credit participation 
followed a hump-shaped pattern. From a low net wealth level, individuals wanted to borrow as 
their net wealth became higher. One explanation could be that individuals are more likely to 
borrow once they acquire some assets to use as collateral. However, as wealth increased beyond 
a certain point, individuals had less need to borrow as their wealth could generate enough income 
for consumption. Similarly, the relationship between the probability of credit market 
participation and the log of income followed a hump-shaped pattern. When income was very 
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low, the marginal utility of consumption was very high. Once income was higher, individuals 
could spend it to consume and needed less to borrow (Chen & Chivakul 2008).  
I expect the same positive and concave relationship in the case of Pakistan. People need access to 
credit for investments, such as, for example, to go to abroad as skilled labor. But when they start 
sending remittances to Pakistan, they do not need credits from formal or informal sources 
anymore. In addition, the flow of workers’ remittances to Pakistan has more than quadrupled in 
the last eight years and it shows no sign of slowing down and one of the major reasons for this 
continuous increase in remittances is an increase worker’s migration (Knock & Sun 2011). 
3.1.5 Transaction costs: 
Transaction costs are also one of the major factors that keep farmers away from loans. 
Transaction costs are the costs of travelling to the lender, opportunity costs of labor for the time 
lost in lengthy application procedures, administrative costs such as paying for loan application 
forms and expenses of updating or organizing legal documents used as collateral and running 
after guarantors (Zander 1994). 
The transaction cost also includes the boring and lengthy paper work, practice loan process 
connected with formal loans, securities risk, incomplete information, the political reasons and the 
accessibility of formal credit institutions (Foltz 2004; Boucher et al. 2007 and Zander 1994). 
Moreover, formal loans involve a lot of paper work, which causes late release of credit in 
addition to administrative charges, which increases the cost of loans to borrowers (Balogun and 
Yusuf 2011). 
 
In rural Sri Lanka, when people asked why people use credit sources other than formal banks, 30 
percent in the semi-urban village and 20 percent in the remote location explained this with 
delayed credit disbursals and lengthy application procedures for institutional loans. And when 
the villagers were asked why they preferred informal credit sources to banks, 30 percent of the 
respondents in the remote village and 25 percent in the semi-urban village cited the difficulty of 
finding guarantors acceptable to banks, as a central issue (Zander 1994). An extra km of distance 
between the village and the nearest bank reduced the probability of borrowing from the bank by 
1% (Tang et al. 2010). 
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According to Cheng (2006), demand for micro-loan in China can be raised by simplifying loan 
application and approval procedures and tailoring the loan terms to the need of the applicants 
according to their loan uses.  
 
3.1.6 Informal lending: 
It is plausible to think that informal lending crowd out formal and micro-finance lending in 
developing countries because of easy access and lending procedures and easier access to 
informal loans for consumption smoothing reasons. In Sargodha district (next to M.B.Din 
district), only 12 percent loans were from formal sector, and among informal sources, 82 percent 
of borrowings were from friends and relatives alone. The explanation was that friends and 
relatives offer loan for every reason and they were better aware of the personal characteristics of 
households. They knew very much about the borrower’s credibility so the fudging rates were 
minimized. The rate of interest was minimal on such loans. Perhaps this was the biggest reason 
of taking loan from this sector (Shah et al. 2008).  
Formal (banks and microfinance) institutions provided credit only for reproduction or 
manufacturing, whereas informal institutions’ offerings were varied in four provinces of 
Vietnam. The formal lenders adopt severe collateral pre requisites to minimize evasion, thus 
separating out poor from the process. The low level of returns, asset growth and limited formal 
lending for consumption smoothing, made the poor households unattractive and render a high-
risk contour for formal lenders. So they moved to the informal credit market to meet their credit 
demands (Barslund and Tarp 2007). 
Literature on rural financial markets revealed that in most developing countries the rural dwellers 
were primarily served by the informal and semiformal financial institutions, including individual 
money lenders, relatives and friends and rotating savings and credit associations. In the case of 
Uganda, the major sources of credit in the rural areas were relatives and friends, self-help 
savings and credit associations, non-governmental organizations and cooperatives, and to some 
extent, government programs (Mpuga 2004). 
In addition, in India, landlords and commission agents gave loans not only for production but 
also for many other purposes. They did not document the contracts and did not involve 
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borrowers in paper work. These things make borrowing easy and gorgeous (Gill 2003). I also 
expect to find higher concentration of informal loans than formal loans in the district M.B.Din. 
 
3.1.7 Consumption smoothing: 
According to the permanent income hypothesis: any change in consumption caused by shocks to 
income (transitory income) could be smoothed sufficiently by borrowing under perfect capital 
markets, because households will try to maximize their utility over the life cycle by borrowing 
when having transitory low income and by saving when having transitory high income 
(Friedman 1957). Thus, demand for household credit is partly derived from the demand for 
smoothing consumption against income shocks (Conning & Udry 2007 and Morduch, 1995).  In 
Vietnam, the main purpose of the loans taken by the poor in peri-urban areas was for non-
production (73.4%). Consumption expenditure such as food, school fees and healthcare 
accounted for about 64% of total loans. On the other hand, only a quarter was used for small 
production and businesses (Doan et al 2010).  
Similarly in the case of Urban Ethiopia, 27.6% formal loan was used for expanding or setting up 
a business and rest was used for consumption purposes (Ibrahim et al 2007). In addition, in many 
developing countries, a significant proportion of the population is not insured or is inadequately 
insured. Many governments are not able to afford safety nets for their citizens to help them 
mitigate adverse shocks. Therefore, adverse health shocks to non-working members of 
households, which do not directly affect household income, will still generate credit demand if 
the households have inadequate savings to pay healthcare bills (Kochar 1995). Previous study in 
Pakistan indicated that villagers used credit, especially informal credit, as the most important 
mechanism to cope with adverse income shocks (Kurosaki 2006).  
 
Like aforementioned studies, I also expect to find that formal loans are mainly used for non-
production activities. 
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3.2 Research Questions & Hypotheses: 
Based on previous studies of different researchers, I formulated the following objectives and 
hypothesis: 
 What are the determinants of demand for credits among small farmers? 
 How do the farmers use the loans - for consumption smoothing or for production 
activities? 
3.2.1 Hypotheses: 
1. Informal lending crowds out formal lending. 
2. High interest rates discourage farmers from applying for loans. 
3. High transaction costs result in less demand for loans. 
4. The majority of loans are taken for consumption smoothing rather than for production 
activities. 
5. Higher educated households demand more credit. 
6. Large family size tends to increase demand for loans. 
7. Income and demand for credits have a negative correlation. 
 
4. METHODOLOGY: 
Methodology is mainly about how data is collected, organized and interpreted with the help of 
quantitative and qualitative methods. This chapter is comprised of two main sections. In 
Research strategy (section 4.1), different issues related to data will be discussed. These issues are 
site selection, background information of study area, method of data collection (i.e. interviews) 
and its components, quality and reliability of data and challenges while collecting data. In the 
subsequent Econometric section (section 4.2), I discuss theoretical models and statistical 
methods to interpret and analyze data.  
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 4.1 Research Strategy: 
In order to analyze demand for credits among small and marginal farmers while considering 
aforementioned factors, I collected cross-sectional data. If I had access to secondary household 
data for this area, a lot of time and finances would have been saved. However, secondary data 
might not have given in-depth information about sensitive issues. 
Site selection:  
To gather information pertaining to demand for credits among farmers, I chose the district Mandi 
Bahauddin for data collection for several reasons. Being resident of this area, I knew the social 
and cultural background. Furthermore, it also saved time and finances which I had to bear in case 
of any other area. I targeted 6 villages from all three tehsils of district M.B.Din in such a manner 
that majority of the lands should be owned by small farmers. Chak Abdullah and Wara Alam 
Shah villages are little far away from nearest local city than Kang sahali, which is nearest among 
all villages. All the households, who were interviwed, owned at least some land but there were 
some households who had rented out their land and earned their income from other activities 
than farming. 
 Background information and sample selection: 
Before I could start the actual interviews, I had to find the households who owned less than 14 
acres of land. One way of doing this was to go to the local revenue department, which keep land 
records of every household. But to access such information is a long and time wasting procedure. 
Another method, which I devised, was to ask the interviewed households to help me to identify 
other small landowners in the village. Meanwhile, I also took sample randomization into account 
so that it should not make data biased. After identification of households by interviewed 
household, I used to write the names of other head of households of whole village on small piece 
of papers and used to ask interviewed head of household to pick up one piece of paper for the 
interview of next household. I repeated same procedure in all six villages. 
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Being a male-dominant society, women are usually not involved in the financial matters of the 
households. Therefore I interviewed only males as only men could give complete information 
about financial matters. 
It was one of the social norms of the society that extreme importance was given to women’s 
pardah. It is the practice of preventing men from seeing women. They were only allowed to go 
out with big shawls covering their body and sometimes, a family member or a relative should 
also go with her for respect and to avoid any inconvenience to her. The honor of a household was 
the second most sacred thing for every household after religion and women of a household were 
considered to be symbols of honor. Even a man was not allowed to pronounce name of a young 
girl or women of any other household publically. Some villages had their own local laws related 
to marriage ceremonies, funerals, festivals, crimes etc. The social system was very much 
complex. More or less, every household had basic information about all other households e.g. 
numbers of members, approximate ages, education and their occupation etc. because men used to 
visit men of other households and women used to visit women of other households frequently. 
 Due to this strong definition of honor, information about sisters and daughters of head of the 
household was considered to be a sensitive issue and so was information about formal and 
informal loans. So, it was important that they had full confidence in the interviewer. For this 
purpose, in the beginning of the interview I assured them of every kind of confidentiality by 
introducing my family background and objective of this research. Because if they faced any 
disrespect in the society due to information leaked by interviewer, they could complaint to the 
head of the interviewer’s household.  
Data collection: 
The data was collected from 123 households. I spent 9 weeks interviewing the farmers of 
different villages with the help of a questionnaire (see appendix 1). I also translated the 
questionnaire into Urdu - the national language (see appendix 2) because I had to seek help from 
Urdu speaking enumerators to save time. The first part of the questionnaire collected information 
about household characteristics, such as gender, age, marital status, education, occupation etc. 
The second part was about the households’ assets and properties. Assets included land, livestock 
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and machinery. The third part was about farmers’ last year production activities. All types of 
commonly cultivated crops, fruits, vegetables and pasture were included. Second last part was 
about other sources of income, for example, income from rented out land, selling of milk, jobs, 
remittances etc. The last part was about credit and borrowing. It was further divided into 3 parts; 
applied and got loan (both formal and informal), applied but could not get and never applied for 
any loan. Those who never applied for loans, they were asked further about their preferences to 
the loans with varying attributes e.g. interest rate, less collateral, payback period, group lending 
etc. with the help of hypothetical loan packages. 
Quality and reliability of data: 
It is possible that respondents might have over or underestimated their production and assets’ 
values, as their production activities do not involve minute measurements. Sometimes they sell 
some kinds of productions in bulks and sometimes sell them standing in the fields. For example, 
in the case of vegetables and fruits, they sell them in bulks at a whole-sale price to the retailers. 
Similarly, in the in case of pasture crops, they do not harvest it rather sell it when it is standing in 
the fields. In case of fruits and vegetables, we used to ask them average weight of a bulk and 
multiplied it with number of bulks to get total production. Similarly, in case of pasture crop, 
sometimes they exchange a small part of one type of pasture crop with another type of pasture 
crop without monetizing them. So in such cases, we had to use standard pasture crop production 
per acre benchmark to find approximate production and income. For instance, we had 
standardized that one *bigha of pasture crop production used to give 8000kg of yield and its 
market value was PKR. 10,000. 
When it came to the loan sections, we also asked hypothetical questions in which they were 
offered different packages of loans with varying attributes like interest rate, collateral, repayment 
period and group lending (see appendix 1) in order to elicit their true preferences. Some 
respondents might not have understood this section well and might not have revealed their true 
preferences. 
 
* 1 bigha = 4 kanal and 8 kanal = 1 acre of land 
22 
 
Challenges in data collection: 
One of most common challenge I faced was that these households had never been interviewed 
before, except for the national census in 1998. Therefore, most of the respondents were afraid 
and reluctant in the beginning of interview. Another major challenge was the lengthiness of the 
interview, they used to get bored because of calculations and having to try to remember last 
year’s activities. In order to make them continuously involved in the interview, we used to 
discuss other non-interview matters with them. 
 Furthermore, we had to do the interviews with each head of household without other 
people present, because they would not reveal personal information in front of other people from 
the community. For this reason, initially, some thought I was a journalist and some believed that 
I came from the tax department. In such cases, we had to give our complete family background 
and home address. They got agreed for interview when they came to know about father and 
grandfather of the interviewer. 
12 households refused to give complete interviews and did not reveal their preferences in case of 
hypothetical loan offers. Some argued that remittances are enough for livelihood and others 
argued that because they had decided that they would never go to the bank to take a loan for 
religious reasons, therefore, it did not make sense to answer these questions. Most household 
heads were busy working in the fields or doing labor work, so I often had to visit several times 
and wait for them for long periods of time. To go to some distant villages, there was also a 
conveyance problem. 
4.2 Econometric and Statistical Models: 
To estimate demand for credit and to know effect of factors on credit demanded, I will use probit 
and OLS models. Using these models, I will be able to predict the demand for credit given the 
characteristics of the households. I will explain difference between both models and also why the 
probit model is better than OLS. With the help of probit model, I will determine the 
characteristics of those who demand for credit in comparison to those who do not. I will also 
examine probabilities of demand for credit among six villages. 
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I assume that every household faced two choices, either to take credit from formal lending 
institution or not. Thus the general model is represented as: 
 Di = f ( Agei, Edui, T_Memi, Total_Yi, T_Assets_value i, lakhi, shahi, badsi, warai, 
chaki, kangi )                                                                                                          (1) 
Where Di is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the individual took credit and 0 otherwise.  Agei 
and Edui represents head of the households’ age and education while T_Memi, Total_Yi and 
T_Assets_valuei represents household size, total income and total value of household’s assets. 
The variables lakhi, shahi, badsi, warai, chaki, and kangi are location dummies representing 
residents of six villages. In the probit model 5 location dummies will be included than 6 
dummies to avoid perfect multicollinearity. 
Model assumes that the error term is a normally distributed random variable, so the estimated 
model is then stated thus; 
 
Got_loani = α0 + α1Agei + α2Edui + α3 T_Memi + α4 Total_Yi + α5 T_Assets_valuei + α6 lakhi 
                   + α7shahi + α8badsi + α9warai + α10chaki + εi                                                (2) 
 
Got_loan represents demand for credit (binary outcome) variable. I will decompose total income 
variable into three types of incomes i.e. livestock income, agricultural production income and 
other sources of income. I will explain reason for doing so in the succeeding chapter. 
 
By the replacement of separate income variables with total income variable, the estimated model 
(2) changes to equation (3): 
 
Got_loani = α0 + α1Agei + α2Edui + α3 T_Memi + α4 Live_Y + α5Prod_Y+ α6Oth_sou_Y+α7 
T_Assets_valuei,+ α8 lakhi + α9shahi + α10badsi + α11warai + α12chaki + εi                        (3) 
 
It is worth mentioning here that all types of incomes are last year (annual) incomes. I will use 
statistical software Stata12 (special edition) for both econometric and qualitative analysis. For 
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descriptive data analysis, I will also take help of different types of charts, tables and figures to 
show different statistical distributions and relationships. 
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: 
I will use econometric models (2) and (3) to see significant effect of different factors on the 
demand for credits among small farmers. Below are all variables and their labels (Table 2). 
Table 2: Variables. 
Variables Labels 
Age Head of household’s age 
Edu Head of household’s Education  
(years of schooling) 
T_Mem Total members in each household 
Live_Y Livestock income (annual) 
Prod_Y (Agricultural) production income (annual) 
Oth_sou_Y Other sources of income (annual) 
Total_Y Total income (annual) 
T_Assets_value Value of total assets of households 
lakh resident of Lakhnewala (Dummy) 
shah resident of Shahidanwali (Dummy) 
bads  resident of Badshahpur (Dummy) 
wara resident of Wara alam shah (Dummy) 
chak  resident of Chak abdullah (Dummy) 
kang  resident of Kangsahali (Dummy) 
Got_loan Demand for credit (binary dependent variable) 
 
According to hypotheses based on the previous studies, I expect the coefficients to have the 
following signs: 
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Table 3: Expected signs of the predictors. 
Variables Expected Signs 
Edu (+) 
T_Mem (+) 
Total_Y Non-linear (+/-) 
Live_Y Non-linear (+/-) 
Prod_Y Non-linear (+/-) 
Oth_sou_Y Non-linear (+/-) 
Interest rate* (-) 
Transaction Cost* (-) 
* These two variables (i.e. interest rate and transaction cost) will be discussed in the descriptive 
analysis and the rest will be examined in econometric analysis section. 
Due to expected nonlinear correlation of income with demand for credit, I will take square of all 
types of income and total income and will include these variables in the probit model. 
 
LiveY_sq Square of livestock income 
ProdY_sq Square of (agricultural) production income 
OthY_sq Square of other sources of income 
TotalY_sq Square of total income 
 
5.1 Descriptive Analysis: 
 
Initially, we distinguish data on the basis of households’ characteristics. Before analyzing data 
descriptively, it is important to take local customs and traditions in social and financial matters 
into account. In this area it is the head of household (HHH) who makes decision without (or 
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sometimes with) consultation of other family members. Therefore, when I will discuss 
characteristics of households, I will be actually discussing characteristics of HHH.  
Only five households are found to be headed by widows and all other households are headed by 
husbands. No women are household heads in the presence of a husband. The average age of 
HHHs is 54 years. In addition, average household size is six persons, ranging from two persons 
to 16 persons in a household.  
5.1.1 Definitions of ‘household’: 
Previous studies have shown that it is difficult to standardize one definition of household in the 
presence of different social and economic customs prevailing in the world (Beaman and Dillon, 
2010). In their paper from rural Mali, Beaman and Dillon (2010) studied the effects of different 
household definitions. They used four different definitions; the first definition requires only that 
members of the household live in the same lodging and acknowledge a common household head. 
The second includes the criteria of the first definition but adds the criterion that households eat 
commonly prepared food together. The third definition includes the criteria from the first 
definition and adds the stipulation that members must work together on at least one agricultural 
plot or in one revenue-generating activity. The fourth definition combines the eating and 
production requirements of the second and third definitions with the criteria from the first 
definition. While taking into account social, economic and traditional customs of this district in 
Pakistan, I have used the second definition of household. 
5.1.2 Education statistics: 
Regarding education, 41 HHHs have never been to school and 19 HHHs got only primary 
education (up to 5th grade). 40 HHHs completed secondary education (10th grade class) and only 
25 out 123 HHHs had the opportunity to continue their education after passing secondary school. 
There was no college in this district 40 years ago. For this reason, the majority of HHHs could 
not get more education than secondary school. To get further education, they had to go to other 
districts, which was not financially possible for most of them. Maximum attained education by a 
HHH is 20 years of education, shown in figure 3. 
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 Fig 3:  Education of Head of the Households (HHHs). 
 
5.1.3 Occupations: 
When it comes to occupation, 85 (68.55%) HHHs are involved in agricultural farming solely and 
12 (9.68%) are doing different jobs along with agricultural farming. The same numbers of HHHs 
(i.e. 12) are doing nothing. Among these 12 HHHs, 5 are widows and it is the local custom that 
women don’t do agricultural farming in spite of death of their husbands. Either any of their sons 
or relatives does it or they rent out their land. The remaining 7 HHHs have rented out their land 
and do some businesses or rely on remittances and pension. 
 
5.1.4 First hypothesis: Informal lending crowds out formal lending. 
Among 123 HHH, 79 HHH (64.22%) never applied for any kind of formal loans and 44 
(35.78%) applied for loans. When the respondents (who never took loan) were asked to rank the 
stated reasons for never applying for any loan, they ranked reason ‘borrow from friends and 
relatives’ as their most likely reason (see Table 7). This showed that majority of them were 
borrowing from informal sources instead of formal sources. The rankings of other stated reasons 
are discussed in next hypothesis. 
 It can be seen that credit rationing is a minimal factor here because among 44 households who 
applied for any loan, 43 (97.72%) got same amount for which they applied for and only one 
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HHH could not get it (2.28%). Carrying dual nationality by this HHH was the reason reported for 
rejection of his application. Because according to eligibility conditions for acquiring agricultural 
loan, given by SBP (2014), the first condition was that the applicant should be genuine farmer 
and for this reason the applicant might had been rejected as he spent most of his time in Canada. 
These figures are shown in Table 4. 
 
   Table 4: Distribution of HHH based on demand for credit. 
Applied 
 Applied Not 
Applied 
Total Got 
Loan 
Rejected Total 
No.  of 
Households 
44 79 123 43 1 44 
Percentage 35.78% 64.22% 100% 97.72% 2.28% 100% 
 
The average loan size from formal institutions was 2870 USD. The minimum and maximum 
loans were 261 and 20070 USD respectively.  
During the interview, the farmers were given a list of prominent banks in the area and were 
asked to give information about how many times they got loan in last 5 years, interest rate, 
installment, collateral etc. Results showed that altogether the HHHs took loans 72 times from 
formal institutions and out of 72; most of loans were taken from ZTBL (i.e. 40 times), shown in 
Table 5.. ZTBL (formerly Agricultural Development Bank) was only meant for agricultural 
financial assistance to the farmers.  
 
Table 5: Formal loans distribution. 
 How many times in last 5 years? 
ZTBL 40 
BOP 3 
NBP 18 
BA 0 
MEEZAN BANK 0 
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UBL 1 
HBL 9 
FAYSAL BANK 1 
Total times 72 
Average formal loan (USD) 2870 
Minimum – Maximum 
(USD) 
261 - 20070 
 
Out of 43 HHH, who got formal loans, more than half i.e. 56.81% (25) households also got loans 
from informal sources (i.e. informal lending, friends, relatives and inter-linkages). These people 
borrowed money from informal sources 141 times, which is almost twice as often as formal 
loans. Not surprisingly, the majority of these loans were taken from friends and relatives i.e. 59 
and 69 times respectively. One important thing to keep in mind is that average loan size from 
informal sources was considerably smaller in size   (one tenth-i.e. 286 USD) than formal loans, 
which seemed obvious because banks could easily arrange bigger amounts for farmers than 
friends and relatives. On the other hand, friends and relatives offered more convenient, free of 
cost and easily accessible loans. 
So this proves that formal lending crowds out informal lending, which could be due to the reason 
that loans from friends and relatives are interest-free. 
 
Table 6:  Informal loans distribution. 
 How many times in last 5 years? 
Informal lending 1 
Friends 59 
Relatives 69 
Inter-linkage 12 
Total times 141 
Average informal loan (USD) 286 
Minimum – Maximum 
(USD) 
20 - 10538 
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5.1.5 Second hypothesis: High interest rates discourage farmers from applying for 
loans. 
To test whether high interest rates discourage farmers from taking loans, I asked respondents to 
rank the reasons for not applying for credit. 
Ranking of the reasons for not applying for credit: In this sub-section, we asked the head 
of households, who never applied for loan, to rank their reasons for not applying for loan. Out of 
79 households, who did not apply for any loan, 77 households helped to fill out this section and 2 
households kept on insisting that remittances are enough to meet basic needs of life and in case 
of emergency, they borrow from friends and relatives but would not talk more about this section. 
The respondents were given 9 possible reasons and were also allowed to give any other reason 
apart from stated reasons. The ranking was based on the following principle i.e. Rank1= most 
likely to Rank9 = most unlikely. To get average score earned by each reason, we calculated mean 
values of each reason. We found that ‘borrow from friends and relatives’ was the most likely 
reason and’ I don’t know about such loans’ was found to be most unlike reason for not taking 
loans from formal sources. This also shows that the respondents were well aware of the 
possibility of loaning from banks. The second most common reason was high rate of interest. 
The ranking of the other reasons is shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Ranking of reasons. 
Reasons Rankings Points 
Borrow from relatives and 
friends 
1  2.94 
Interest rate is high 2 3.37 
Fear of payback failure 3 3.50 
Sell my asset 4 3.87 
It is against religion 5 4.66 
Not sure about loan approval 6 5.80 
Don't have much land for 7 6.03 
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collateral 
Get loan from moneylenders 8 8.03 
I don’t know about such loans 9 8.06 
 
Choice of preference: 
In the last sub-section of the questionnaire, we wanted to examine true preferences of the 
respondents who had never applied for loans.  We gave the 79 respondents who had never 
applied for loans different hypothetical packages and asked them to choose one of two different 
packages. There were 4 different packages in total, and by comparing each offer with all other 
packages, I created 6 different scenarios. These packages are different when it comes to interest 
rate, installment, collateral and group lending as shown in Table 8 and 9. 
Table 8: Detail of all packages. 
Packages Amount 
 
 
(USD) 
Interest 
rate 
 
(%) 
Payback 
period 
 
(Years) 
Collateral 
 
 
(Acres of 
land) 
Payback 
installment 
 
(USD per 
year) 
Group 
lending 
 
(Number 
of persons)  
Package 1 2000 10 2 5 - - 
Package 2 2000 17 2 3 - - 
Package 3 2000 10 2 3 1000 - 
Package 4 2000 10 2 - - 4 
 
Table 9: Scenarios. 
Scenarios Packages Your preferences 
Scenario 1 Package  1 vs  Package  2  
Scenario 2 Package  1 vs  Package  3  
Scenario 3 Package  1 vs  Package  4  
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Scenario 4 Package  2 vs  Package  3  
Scenario 5 Package  2 vs  Package  4  
Scenario 6 Package  3 vs  Package  4  
 
The total loan amount (2000 USD) and payback period was the same in all packages except in 
package 3, where borrowers were supposed to return half of the amount with interest to the bank 
after one year and the remaining half in the next year. 
Before discussing the results, it is worth mentioning that 67 households helped to complete this 
sub-section out of 79 households. Among those who did not cooperate in this part, a majority of 
them failed to understand the hypothetical nature of the questions and instead they got scared and 
asked questions like whether the interviewer was from the tax office or a journalist? Others 
claimed that they were against all types of banks.  They argued that they had never felt any need 
to take loan from a bank and that they would not fill out this part. 
Scenario 1: Package 1 vs Package 2 
In case of scenario 1 (shown in Table 10.1), 57 (85.07%) households elected to choose package 1 
rather than package 2. Here I compared low interest rate with low collateral. Respondents 
showed that they would like to take the loan which would offer low interest rate rather than less 
collateral. To test whether respondents were indifferent between two packages, I tested 
hypothetical mean value (i.e. 1.5) of scenario 1 against actual mean. How did I get 1.5 as 
hypothetical mean value? We know that in this scenario, respondents were asked to choose either 
1 or 2. So if we add all 1s and 2s and divide them by total number of observations, respondents 
to be significantly indifferent, mean value should be equal or very near to 1.5 (i.e. 1+2=3/2=1.5). 
The test for significance of this frequency distribution showed that mean value of scenario1 was 
statistically significantly smaller than 1.5. The p-values for two-tailed and left tailed test were 
significant (shown in result below).  Meaning that majority of respondents were not indifferent, 
but significantly chose package 1 against package 2. 
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Table 10.1: Scenario 1. 
Package 1 vs. Package  2 Frequency Percentage 
1 57 85.07 
2 10 14.93 
 
T-test for scenario 1. 
 
Scenario 2: Package 1 vs Package 3 
In scenario 2, interest rate is same (at 10%) in both packages. Package 3 offered loan at lower 
collateral (3 acres of land) but contained an additional condition of installment. Meaning that 
borrower had to return half the loan with interest after one year. 56.72% of households chose 
package 1 against package 3 (chosen by 43.28%). Here I compared high collateral (package 1) 
with installment condition (package 3). To test whether respondents were indifferent between 
two packages, I tested hypothetical mean value of 2 of scenario 2 (i.e. 1+3=4/2=2) against actual 
mean. The test for significance showed that I could not reject the null hypothesis that 
hypothetical mean is equal to actual sample mean. Meaning that respondents were indifferent 
between the two packages. 
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Table 10.2: Scenario 2. 
Package 1 vs. Package 3 Frequency Percentage 
1 38 56.72 
3 29 43.28 
T-test for scenario 2. 
 
Scenario 3: Package 1 vs Package 4 
In this scenario I compared high collateral with group lending, given same interest rate in both 
packages and no collateral in group lending. Respondents were informed about basic 
requirements of group lending e.g. at least 4 people would be required to make a group and could 
apply for loan, each member of the group was guarantor of other 3 people so if any member 
defaulted, other 3 members would repay defaulter’s loan. Frequency distribution showed that 28 
respondents chose package 1 and rest 39 chose package 4. To check significance, I tested null 
hypothesis that hypothetical mean of 2.5 was equal to sample mean and I found that p-value was 
greater than 0.05, which meant that the null hypothesis could not be rejected. It suggests that 
given the same interest rate in group lending as in other kinds of loans, group lending might not 
be able to increase credit participation in this area. 
Table 10.3: Scenario 3. 
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Package 1 vs. Package 4 Frequency Percentage 
1 28 41.79 
4 39 58.21 
 
T-test for scenario 3. 
 
Scenario 4: Package 2 vs Package 3 
In scenario 4, I compared high interest rate (17%) with low interest rate (10%) but additional 
installment condition (i.e. return half amount after one year). 68.66% of respondents chose 
package 3 against package 2 (31.34% chose it). The T-test showed that the null hypothesis was 
rejected that hypothetical mean (i.e. 2.5) was equal to the sample mean. The right-tailed test was 
also significant and therefore I can conclude that actual sample mean was greater than 2.5, as 
shown in test below. It clearly showed that the majority of households preferred loans which 
offered lower interest rate even when they had to pay back half of the amount after one year 
instead of high interest rate loans which had to be returned after 2 years. This scenario shows the 
importance of low interest rate for respondents, while making decisions regarding participation 
in the credit market. 
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Table 10.4: Scenario 4. 
Package 2 vs. Package 3 Frequency Percentage 
2 21 31.34 
3 46 68.66 
 
T-test for scenario 4. 
 
Scenario 5: Package 2 vs Package 4 
Similarly, in scenario 5, package 2 had high interest rate (17%) with 3 acres of land as collateral 
and package 4 offered low interest rate (10%) with no collateral (group lending). Result showed 
that 77.61% preferred package 4 and remaining (22.39%) preferred package 2. It was a slightly 
easier choice for respondents compared to scenarios 2 & 3. But it is difficult to tell whether low 
interest rate or no collateral was the most important factor when choosing. We have already 
discussed this in scenario 2 and 3 where we saw that when interest rate was same in two offers, 
respondents were almost equally divided. It implies that interest rate could be the main factor 
determining the choices of respondents. 
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Table 10.5: Scenario 5. 
Package 2 vs. Package 4 Frequency Percentage 
2 15 22.39 
4 52 77.61 
 
T-test for scenario 5: 
 
 
Scenario 6: Package 3 vs Package 4 
In scenario 6, 25 households (37.31%) preferred to choose package 3 and majority (62.69%) of 
them chose package 4. Package 3 demanded collateral of 3 acres of land and an additional 
condition of installment repayment after one year. Package 4 had no collateral requirement other 
than guarantee of each member in the group towards other 3 members. It showed that when it 
came to make a choice between returning half amount after one year and group lending, the 
majority preferred group lending.  
Another important point is that in these scenarios, it seems like collateral requirement becomes 
less important, which could be due to the reason that the collateral requirement is small relative 
to land holdings in these areas. Because in scenario 3, where comparison was between collateral 
and group lending, we saw that 41.79% of households chose collateral and 58.21% chose group 
lending. Keep in mind that package 3 even demanded less collateral (i.e. 3 acres) than package 1. 
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So it implied that returning half amount after one year was more difficult for households than 
becoming guarantor of other members in group lending (see Table 10.6). The succeeding T-test 
also verified the statistical significance of frequency distribution of this scenario. 
Table 10.6: Scenario 6. 
Package 3 vs. Package 4 Frequency Percentage 
3 25 37.31 
4 42 62.69 
 
T-test for scenario 6: 
 
 
Moreover, I also wanted to know whether households who got loans would like to take more 
loans from banks in future. Out of 43, 17 (38.6%) households responded ‘yes’ and remaining 26 
(61.40%) households said ‘no’. Out of these 26 respondents, 20 (77%) households gave high 
interest rate as the main reason. The second most common reason (4 respondents) was ‘I don’t 
need formal loans anymore’.  
While concluding this sub-section, I can say that households give first priority to low interest 
rate. The second important thing is installment condition. It implies that returning half loan after 
one year is more difficult for them than returning full amount after two years. This could be 
because farmers usually do not have other sources of income and they do not earn and save much 
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from agriculture so that they could repay loan. Another reason could be that their discount rates 
are higher than the interest rates, so that paying back after two years give them a higher net 
present value than paying back after one year.  The collateral condition is the third in the list of 
priorities. They prefer smaller collateral conditions in the requirements list for a loan.  Group 
lending is the least important. If it is correct that group lending is not an important factor for the 
households, this requires further research by policy makers to understand the reasons behind this. 
There might be social and cultural factors involved, which is beyond scope of this research. 
5.1.6 Third hypothesis: High transaction costs result in less demand for loans. 
It was also hypothesized that high transaction costs result in less demand for loans. Apart from 
stated reasons in the questionnaire; 20 respondents out of 79 also stated other reasons, such as 
corruption, remittances and no need (to get loan). Not surprisingly, 40% described corruption as 
one reason for them not to apply for any loan. Other reasons included difficult to find guarantor 
who is acceptable to banks, lengthy and difficult procedural works and administrative charges. 
This shows a possible impact of transaction costs on the households’ decision. 
5.1.7 Fourth hypothesis: Loans are taken for consumption smoothing rather than 
production activities. 
The data showed that out of the 43 households who took formal loans, 20 (46.52%) used their 
loans for consumption purposes such as marriage of son or daughter, house construction or 
renovation, to repay private and formal loans etc.. The other 23 (53.48%) households used the 
loans for agricultural purposes like to purchase seeds, fertilizers, tractor, fuel etc. as shown in 
Table 11.1. 
Table 11.1: Loan spending distribution. 
Total formal loans got 
(Agricultural + Non-
agricultural loans) 
Loans spent on 
agricultural activities 
Loans spent on non-
agricultural activities 
43 23 20 
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In table 11.2, I decomposed the loans further. Out of the 43 households who received formal 
loans, 37 households applied for agricultural loans from different banks but only 24 respondents 
(64.86%) used these loans for agricultural purposes. The remaining 13 households spent these 
loans on consumption purposes. 6 households out of 43 households applied for loans for other 
purposes than agriculture. All of these loans were spent on activities for which they were taken. 
Table 11.2. Further decomposition of Loan spending distribution. 
No. of 
agricultural 
Loans. 
No. of 
households 
used loan on 
agricultural 
activities. 
Percentage No. of non-
agricultural 
loans. 
No. of 
households 
used loan on 
non-
agricultural 
activities. 
Percentage 
37 24 64.86% 6 6 100% 
 
My data did not verify the hypothesis that the majority of the loans were for consumption 
smoothing. On the contrary, I found that 54.55% were spent on production activities while 
45.45% of respondents spent their loans on non-agricultural activities. 
5.2 Econometric Analysis: 
In this chapter, I will report the regression results on individual demand for credit. I will test the 
following hypotheses in this chapter: 
 5.  Higher educated households demand more credit. 
6.  Large family size tends to increase demand for loans. 
7.  Income and demand for credits have a negative correlation. 
I will test both total income and three different decomposed income variables; livestock income; 
agricultural production income; and other sources of income. The reason for decomposing 
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income is to elicit a correlation between income and demand for credit. For instance, it could be 
possible that demand for credit might have a positive relation with production income and 
negative or no relation with livestock income, which could result in no clear significant 
relationship between demand for credit and overall income. I will also look at demand for credits 
in six different villages (or locations) of the same district.  
Following table 12 shows summary of variables used in probit model. 
Table 12: Summary 
 
 
The overall probit model was statistically significant at 95% of confidence interval, showing that 
at least one of the regression coefficients was not equal to zero (Table 13). 
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Table 13: Stata results 
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5.2.1 Marginal effects:    
The marginal effects measure the ceteris paribus effects of changes in the regressors affecting the 
features of the outcome variable. I need to look at marginal effects of all regressors, that is, how 
much the (conditional) probability of the demand for credit would change when one unit of a 
regressor is changed, holding other regressors constant (Table 14). 
Table 14: Marginal effects. 
 
5.2.2 Fifth hypothesis: Higher educated households demand more credit 
I found a significant positive impact of education on demand for credit. However, interpretation 
of the coefficients in probit regression is not as straightforward as the interpretations of 
coefficients in linear regression or logit regression.  The increase in probability attributed to a 
one-unit increase in a given predictor is dependent both on the values of the other predictors and 
the starting value of the given predictors. The stata results in Table 13 showed that increase in 
years of schooling would increase the predicted probability of demand for credit (with 0.009 p-
value), as expected in table 3. The marginal effects in table 14 showed that one unit change in the 
education variable increases the probability of demand for credit by 0.022. This might be 
because higher education reduces the costs of gathering information and makes it easier to 
44 
 
understand loan regulations. It could also imply that higher educated respondents had higher 
income to repay loans. 
5.2.3 Sixth hypothesis: A large family size tends to increase demands for loans. 
Surprisingly, household size showed no significant impact on the demand for credit. The twoway 
graph showing demand for credit (Got_loan) on the y-axis and households size (T_Mem) on the 
x-axis revealed a positive pattern in the data (Figure 4). The shaded area above and below the 
fitted values prediction line is the confidence interval area. The closer this shaded area is to the 
prediction line; the more statistically significant is the coefficient. Figure 4 shows that the 
relation between demand for credit and household size is positive, but it is not significant 
because the data points are not close enough to the prediction line. A small data set could be the 
reason for the insignificance. 
It was plausible to use consumer/worker ratio variable instead of household size variable in line 
with the intuition that higher consumer/worker ratio could lead to increase in demand for credit. 
The result showed that (like household size) consumer/worker ratio also did not affect the 
demand for credit. 
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Figure 4: Households size and demand for credit. 
5.2.4 Seventh hypothesis: Income and demand for credits have a negative correlation. 
All (decomposed) incomes: 
The probit model showed insignificant relationships between all sources of income and demand 
for credit. I also expected a possible non-linear relationships between all income variables and 
demand for credit. Because, it was plausible that increase in income could increase demand for 
credit first as farmer might want to enhance agricultural production or to start a small business 
along with agricultural farming. After a period of time, the farmer could be self-reliant and need 
no further financial assistance, which might result in decrease in demand for credits with further 
increase in income. I generated variables by taking square of all sources of income variables (i.e. 
LiveY_sq, ProdY_sq and OthY_sq). When included in the probit model, these variables were 
also insignificant.  
Livestock income: 
However, the quadratic fitted values graph between demand for credit and (squared) livestock 
annual income variable showed a convex relation. This could imply that increase in livestock 
income first lead to a decrease in demand for credit, then after a certain point an increase in 
livestock income would increase demand for credit.  However, I cannot rely on this result 
because of insignificance of this variable. Again, a small data set could be the reason for the 
insignificance. The intuition behind this convexity could be that when livestock income is 
increasing, farmers needs for loans decrease. After a certain amount of increase in livestock 
income, they might think about taking loans for enhancement of their livestock or to start other 
production activities along with livestock farming.  
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Figure 5:  Quadratic fitted-values graph between (squared) annual livestock income and demand 
for credit. 
 
Production income: 
In the case of agricultural production income, the quadratic fitted values graph (Figure 6) 
showed a concave relationship between demand for credit and agricultural production income.  
The intuition could be that at lower level of agricultural production income credit is needed to 
enhance production activities for instance by renting more land or buying agricultural inputs 
such as improved seed and fertilizer. At higher levels of agricultural production income, they 
might not need as much credits anymore.  This could be because of management problems of big 
lands, unavailability of more lands to rent etc. Again, since the coefficient on this variable was 
insignificant, I cannot trust this result either.  
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Figure 6: Quadratic fitted-values graph between (squared) annual (agricultural) production 
income and demand for credit. 
 
Other sources of income: 
Like the livestock income variable, the quadratic fitted other sources of income variable also 
showed a convex relationship with demand for credit (Figure 7). Other sources of income 
included *selling of milk, salary, business, land rents, remittances and pension. The reasons 
behind this convex relationship could be the same as in the case of livestock income. For 
instance, if a household’s income increased due to job, promotion in job, land rents, remittances 
etc. then at first demand for credit could decrease. After sometime, when they have savings in 
the banks, it might be possible that they could take loans by relying on these savings, which 
would result in increased demand for credit. 
*It is worth mentioning here that livestock income was the last year income generated from selling of small and big 
animals. Selling of milk was categorized as a small business (i.e. other source of income). 
48 
 
 It implies that the relationship between demand for credit and all incomes also depends on other 
things e.g. availability of land for rent, rents on lands, different crops and livestock markets, etc., 
but these elements are beyond the scope of the current study. 
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Figure 7: Quadratic fitted-values graph between (squared) annual other sources of income and 
demand for credit. 
 
Total income: 
In Table 15 I ran the same regression, but with total income instead of decomposed income 
sources.  The regression analysis did not yield any significant results for the income variables.  
Figure 8 shows a concave relationship between demand for credit and total income, which might 
imply that increase in total income would eventually decrease demand for credit (fig. 8). It might 
imply that at first when income increased, farmers demanded credits to enhance agricultural 
activities like taking land on rent, buying of new livestock or establishing a small business, and 
then afterwards they might not need any loan for financial support. However, this result is not 
significant, as can be seen by the heavy shaded area around the fitted line. 
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Table 15: Probit model with total income. 
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Fig 8: 
Quadratic fitted-values graph between (squared) annual total income and demand for credit. 
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Location (villages): 
In case of location (villages) dummies, being resident of village Lakhnewala compared with 
being resident of Kang Sahali, would have higher probability of taking a loan by 0.29 (with 0.04 
p-values) which is statistically significant at 95% of confidence interval. Local customs of the 
people of this area could be a factor that encourages people to take loan from banks. Other 
factors could be relatively high literacy rate, better roads and transportation system, convenient 
access to and short distance to banks etc. Also residents of Badshahpur village had 0.26 higher 
probability of taking loans than residents of Kang sahali, with p-values 0.08. This dummy 
coefficient was statistically significant at 90% of confidence interval. Surprisingly, being 
resident of Shahidanwali did not show any significant effect on demand for credit. Although 
Shahidanwali is situated on the same road connecting Lakhnewala to the main city and it was the 
nearest village to Lakhnewala. Low literacy rate and higher assets value could be reasons for low 
demand for credit in this village. The other two villages, Wara Alam Shah and Chak Abdullah 
did not show any significant difference from Kang Sahali. These two villages are situated 
relatively far away from a main city and also village Wara Alam Shah has a relatively low 
literacy rate. This could be a reason for less demand for credits. Since Kang Sahali is a relatively 
well established village compared to the other five villages, and is also situated on the Grand 
Trunk road which connected two districts. Being relatively high income earners as shown in 
table 16, the majority of the households were involved in non-agricultural activities, and also 
access to remittances could be a reason for lower demand for credits. 
Table 16: Characteristics of villages. 
 Lakh Shah Bads Wara Chak Kang 
Obs. 27 22 21 20 16 17 
Household 
size (mean) 
7.6 5.22 5.95 5.4 6.5 5.64 
Edu 
(HHH) 
11 10 12 9 11 11 
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≥10th grade 
Assets 
value. USD 
(mean) 
5114.38 5837.72 4767.14 2644.20 5750.81 13756.94 
Total 
income. 
USD(mean) 
13159.02 10508.57 15385.03 6487.18 16317.49 30113.95 
 
5.3.1 Test for Multicollinearity: 
Multicollinearity is the existence of a linear relationship between some or several explanatory 
variables of a regression model. Apart from multicollinearity tests in stata, there are some signs 
of possible existence of multicollinearity for example if R-square is very high and few or none of 
the regression coefficients are statistically significant. The primary concern is that as the degree 
of multicollinearity increases, the regression model estimates of the coefficients become unstable 
and the standard errors for the coefficients can get wildly inflated (Jelstad, 2001). The “vif” 
command is used in stata to check for multicollinearity. VIF stands for variance inflation factor. 
This command can only be used after ordinary least square (OLS) regression is run. I ran the 
regression quietly. The VIF command result is given below (see Table 17.1a). Similarly I also 
applied same command to test for multicollinearity in OLS model with total income instead of 
separate income variables (see Table 17.1b). 
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Table 17.1a: Multicollinearity test (with squared income variables) 
 
Table 17.1b: Multicollinearity test (with squared total income) 
 
As a rule of thumb, a variable whose VIF value is greater than 10 may merit further 
investigation. Tolerance, defined as 1/VIF, is used to check on the degree of collinearity. A 
tolerance value lower than 0.1 is comparable to a VIF of 10. It shows that the variable could be 
considered as a linear combination of other independent variables.  
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In above result, no variable has VIF value greater than 10 but income variables and their squared 
variables have considerably higher VIF values. The reason is that income variables and their 
squared variable measure same thing (i.e. income) so this means that squared variables are 
redundant here.  
So to solve this problem, I did centering of income variables by subtracting the mean of income 
variables from each value. I called these new variables as “prodymean”, “liveymean” and 
“othymean”, and then I took square of these new variables. I named these quadratic variables as 
c1, c2 and c3 respectively. After inclusion in the probit model, the quadratic variables 
coefficients did not change. (Table 17.2). 
 
Table 17.2: Probit model after centering income variables. 
 
 
Now the VIF values were much better than Table 17.1a. 
Table 17.3a: Multicollinearity test after centering income variables. 
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Similarly, after centering of total income variable, I called this new variable ‘c4’. I ran OLS 
regression quietly and tested it for multicollinearity. 
 
Table 17.3b: Multicollinearity test after centering total income. 
 
These VIF values were even better than Table 17.1b.  
It implied that there was no possibility of multicollinearity among independent variables. 
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5.3.2 Endogeneity: 
Endogeneity refers to the fact that an independent variable included in the model is correlated 
with unobservables relegated to the error term. Endogeneity can arise as a result of measurement 
error, autoregression with autocorrelated errors, simultaneity and omitted variables (Reichstein 
nd).  
It is plausible that I might have possible endogeneity problem in my data due to following 
variables: 
Education 
I suspect that education variable could be an endogenous variable. It could be correlated with 
caste of respondent (because high caste people could be more educated than low caste people), 
availability of school facility in a village, level of educational institution (i.e. school, college or 
university) near villages, tuition fees difference between private and government schools and  
availability of transport facilities. These factors might have no direct relationship with demand 
for credit but these factors could influence level of education of a head of household. For 
example, more people would be highly educated in a village due to easy access to school, college 
and university. 
Livestock income: 
Livestock income could also be endogenous variable because following factors could influence 
income from livestock; types of animals, animals’ mortality rate, proper vaccinations, distance 
from livestock market and structure of livestock market (monopoly, oligopoly or competitive). It 
is plausible that these factors might not have direct relation with demand for credit, but would 
possibly affect livestock income. 
Production income: 
In case of agricultural production income, factors such as area under cultivation, quality of seed, 
quality of soil, type of crop (cash crop, food crop or pasture crop), irrigation facility and social 
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contact with wholesaler (who buys crops from farmers) could possibly influence production 
income. 
Other sources of income: 
The other source of income includes; land rents, selling of milk, job, labor, pension, remittances 
and business income. The factors such as location of rented out land (high rent on land near road 
or canal), selling of high or low fat milk, remittances from different countries and years in abroad 
might not have direct impact on demand for credit but could possibly influence the income from 
other sources. 
Due to lack of information, I could not use any variable as an instrumental variable for 
education, livestock income and other sources of income to solve for possible endogeneity 
problem. But I have shown an example to illustrate how I could have solved endogeneity 
problem in case of production income. 
To eradicate endogeneity, there is no perfect complete solution. The possible solutions are; do 
nothing and accept endogeneity, find a suitable proxy for the unobserved - which then is not 
unobserved anymore or apply instrumental variable two stage least square regression (Antonakis 
et al, 2014). In my case, I would have used an instrumental variable probit model because 
ivprobit model is more appropriate in case of continuous endogenous variable (e.g. other sources 
of income and production income variables). 
Possible solution: 
If production income had significant impact on demand for credit (which is not the case in my 
analysis) then it would have been plausible to think that the variable ‘cultivation’ (area under 
cultivation) could be used as an instrumental variable, because more area under cultivation 
means more production income. For the sake of understanding, I tested and found a significant 
relationship between production income and the cultivation variable. Using cultivation as an 
instrumental variable, I could eradicate endogeneity as shown by Wald test in the end of stata 
result (Table 18.1). 
 
57 
 
Table 18.1: Probit model with endogenous regressor. 
 
 
The insignificance of the Wald test shows that there is not sufficient information in the sample to 
reject the null that there is no endogeneity. 
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This test also showed that it might be appropriate to use regular probit regression. 
5.3.3 Why not OLS? 
The essence of any prediction model is the fitness function, which quantifies the optimality 
(goodness or accuracy) of a solution (predictions) (Ratner, 2014). I could have used the Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) model in place of binary outcome (probit) model. The stata result of the 
OLS model is given below in Table 19. 
Table 19: OLS regression 
 
The magnitude of coefficients estimates are different than for the probit model, but their 
respective p-values do not change much, which means that the same regressors are statistically 
significant in both models (except constant term). The important concern is the difference in 
standard errors. The OLS model has higher standard errors than the probit model. The reason for 
this could be that OLS is not restrained to between 0 and 1 as shown in the following figure 9. 
The figure shows a linear prediction line between demand for credit (on y-axis) and annual 
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production income (on x-axis). It can be seen that some prediction crossed 0 and 1 of demand for 
credit variable. 
The probit model is always restrained to range between 0 and 1 which makes it more accurate in 
predicting the probability- that a household would demand credit- than OLS. The OLS measures 
changes in expected value of demand for credit while probit coefficients measures changes in 
probabilities. In addition, the probit estimates are more closely aligned with observed 
probabilities than OLS. 
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Fig 9: Demand for loan (y-axis) and linear prediction line (x-axis) of production income. 
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6. CONCLUSION: 
In this study, I identified factors and the magnitudes of influence of these factors, on demand for 
credit among small farmers in Mandi-Bahauddin district in Pakistan. Federal and provincial 
governments and NGOs are responsible for credit disbursement in Pakistan. Agricultural credit 
concept is not new, but rather dates back to early 1960s when Agricultural Development Bank 
(now ZTBL) was established (in 1961) by federal government to meet credit needs of rural areas 
of Pakistan. Both federal and provincial governments and private organizations are well aware of 
the importance of credits. For instance, Ali & Alam (in 2010) found that credit disbursements by 
PPAF decreased the poverty level of borrowers from 6.61% to 3.07%. The success of 
microcredit partly depends on demand for credit among the general public. In addition, demand 
for credit depends on many different factors, such as education, households’ size, interest rate, 
collateral, assets, income etc.  
To identify the impact of these factors on demand for credit, I conducted interviews with 123 
small farmers in six villages of the district Mandi Bahauddin. With the help of this dataset, I 
tested seven hypotheses, of which three were tested by quantitative method and the other four 
were tested by qualitative methods. 
In the qualitative analysis, I first tested the hypothesis that informal lending crowds out formal 
lending.  Out of 123 households, I found that 79 (64.22%) never applied for any formal loans and 
44 (35.78%) households did apply for loans. Out of the 44 households applying for loans, only 
one household’s application was rejected and the other 43 households got the same amount for 
which they applied.  Altogether, the 43 households had gotten formal loans 72 times during the 
last five years and informal loans 141 times. Furthermore, those who never applied for formal 
loans ranked ‘borrow from friends and relatives’ as the most likely reason for not applying for 
such loans. Thus, my results indicate that informal lending crowds out formal lending. 
 Moreover, their second most likely reason for not applying for loan was the high interest rates. 
To double check, the farmers were presented with six scenarios comprising comparison of four 
different hypothetical loan packages and were asked to choose one package in each scenario, 
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They ALWAYS preferred the loan package that offered lower interest rate. This confirmed the 
second hypothesis that high interest rates discourage farmers from applying for loans.  
Apart from the above stated reasons, 20 respondents out of 79 also indicated other reasons, such 
as corruption, remittances and no need (to get loan). Not surprisingly, 40% described corruption 
as a reason for them not applying for any loan. This indicates that high transaction costs could 
also result in less demand for loans.  
 The data could not verify the fourth hypothesis that the majority of formal loans were taken for 
consumption smoothing rather than for production activities. On the contrary, out of 43 
respondents, I found that 53.48% of respondents spent their loans on production activities and 
46.52% spent their loans on non-agricultural activities. 
In the quantitative analysis, I used a probit model to analyze the impact of education, household 
size and income on demand for credit. I decomposed income into three different categories of 
income i.e. livestock income, agricultural production income and other sources of income. To 
test the fifth hypothesis, that higher educated households demand more credit, I found that one 
year of education of head of household increased the probability of demand for credit by 0.022. 
I found no significant impact of household size on demand for credit. However, the coefficient 
had the expected positive sign. A small data set could be the reason for the insignificance. 
Furthermore, I found no significant correlation between all types of income and demand for 
credit. However, in the case of livestock income, I found a convex (but insignificant) relationship 
with demand for credit. The agricultural production income had insignificant concave 
relationship. The relationship between other sources of income and demand for credit was 
convex like livestock income. I also tested the impact of total income on demand for credit and 
found an insignificant concave relationship. 
In case of location dummies, being resident of villages Lakhnewala and Badshahpur would have 
higher probability (i.e. 0.28 and 0.25 respectively) to demand for credit than being resident of 
village Kangsahali. The villages Shahidanwali, Wara Alam Shah and Chak Abdullah did not 
show any significant probabilities. 
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APPENDIX 1: ENGLISH QUESTIONNAIRE  
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Questionnaire Number  
Date  
Household code  
Household Tehsil  
Household Village  
Name of person interviewed  
Head of Household  
 
1. HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS 
a) People living in the household: 
Head of the Household: Husband…… Wife…….. Grandfather…….. Uncle………Eldest 
son……. Other (specify)……… 
Sex Age Relation 
to HHH 
Civil 
status 
Years of 
education 
Studying Occupation/main 
skills 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
Age: years 
Sex: 1= feminine, 2=masculine. 
Relation to household head: 1=wife, 2=husband, 3=child, 4=grandchild, 5=brother, 6=sister, 7=cousin, 
8=uncle, 9=Aunt, 10=daughter-in-law. 
Civil status: 1=married, 2=single or separated, 3=divorced, 4=widowed 
Studying: 1=yes, 0=No 
Occupation/main skills: 1=student, 2=housewife, 3=hired labor, 4=Job, 5=farm activity, 6=student & Job, 
7=student&farm activity, 8=business, 9=Job&farm activity, 10= do nothing, 11=others (specify) 
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b) Does any member of the household live outside the household you live in? If yes, then 
Name Place Purpose How long When 
coming 
back 
Monthly 
money 
sends hh. 
      
      
      
      
 
2. HOUSEHOLD’S ASSETS & PROPERTIES: 
a) Animals 
Type Number Quantity sold 
the last year 
Price Comments 
Poultry     
Cows     
Sheep & goats     
Buffaloes     
Horse     
Donkey     
Fishes     
     
b) Area of land. 
 Total 
(Acres) 
Cultivation Residence 
(Marlas) 
Business 
(Marlas) 
Idle Rented 
in 
Rented 
out 
Other 
Land         
Idle land: decided not to use in near future. 
1 acre=8 kanals=160 Marlas 
c) Other Assets 
Type Number Approx. Price Comments 
Car    
Tractor    
Rotavator    
Combine Harvester    
Trolley    
Motorcycle    
Bicycle    
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Plow    
Tractor blade    
Spray machine    
Tractor-spray 
machine 
   
Thresher    
    
 
3. PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES LAST YEAR (INCOME): 
Crop Size 
(Acre) 
Total 
quantity 
Quantity 
sold 
Quantity 
consumed 
Price Comments 
Rice       
Wheat       
Sugarcane       
Cotton       
Vegetables       
Pulses       
Orange(kinnow)       
Banana       
Mango       
Lemon       
Guava       
Pasture       
Melon       
Watermelon       
Bamboo       
       
       
       
*4 kanal=1Bigha, 1Bigha=8000kg pasture  
 
4. OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME (LAST YEAR) 
Source Quantity Price Comments 
Rent out land    
Traded items    
Gifts    
Milking    
Fish farms    
Labor    
70 
 
Remittances    
Job    
Business    
Pension    
Land sold    
    
    
 
5. LOAN/BORROWING:  
Have you ever applied for any loan from the bank or any financial institution? 
----- If yes and got loan as well then go to sub-section (a). 
----- applied but could not get it, go to sub-section (b). 
----- If no, then go to sub-section (c). 
a) Formal borrowers/lenders: 
Have you ever got any loan from the bank or any financial institution? If yes, then 
 
Source How many 
times in 
last 5 
years? 
Amount 
in Rs. 
last time 
For how 
many 
months 
last time 
Interest 
rate 
Payment 
frequency 
(Installm-
ent) 
Collateral Commen
ts 
ZTBL        
BoP        
NBP        
BA*        
Meezan Bank        
UBL        
HBL        
Faysal Bank        
        
 
 
*ZTBL = Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited 
*BoP = The Bank of Punjab 
*NBP = National Bank of Pakistan. 
*BA = The Bank Al-Falah. 
*UBL= United Bank Limited 
 
For what purpose do you apply or get loan or borrow money, generally?  
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............................................................................................................................ 
Where do you use them, generally? .................................................................................... 
Would you take another loan (after this) if it is possible?      Yes............./ No.................. 
If yes, what would you use it for? ....................................................................................... 
If no, why not? .................................................................................................................... 
Any other comment or suggestion………………………………………………………... 
Informal borrowers: 
Source How many 
times in 
last 5 
years? 
Amount 
in Rs. 
last time 
For how 
many 
months 
last time 
Interest 
rate 
Payment 
frequency 
(Installm-
ent) 
Collateral Commen
ts 
Informal 
lending 
       
Friends        
Relatives        
Inter-linkages        
        
        
Inter-linkage: Getting loan from supplier or seller. 
For what purpose do you apply or get loan or borrow money, generally?  
............................................................................................................................ 
Where do you use them, generally? .................................................................................... 
Would you take another loan (after this) if it is possible?      Yes............./ No.................. 
If yes, what would you use it for? ....................................................................................... 
If no, why not? .................................................................................................................... 
Any other comment or suggestion………………………………………………………... 
b) Applied but could not get loan: 
If you applied and could not get, what could be reason(s)? .................................................. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Do you want to apply for another time? ............................................................................... 
If no, why not? ……………………………………………………………………………. 
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(c) Never applied: 
Why did you never apply for any loan from a Bank or any financial institution? 
................................................................................... 
Rank the following reasons: (Rank 1=most likely to Rank 10=most unlikely) 
a. I don't know about such loans…………… 
b. Interest rate is high……………………… 
c. Fear of payback failure…………….……. 
d. It’s against religion……………….…….. 
e. Borrow from relatives and friends…..……... 
f. Get loan from moneylender……...……… 
g. Sell my asset ……………………………….. 
h. Not sure about loan approval……………. 
i. Don’t have much land for collateral…..…. 
j. Other (specify)………………………………………………………………………… 
Please choose one offer from each group: 
Package 1 Amount (Rs) Interest rate Payback 
period 
collateral 
 0.2 Million 10.00% 2years  5 acres land 
 
Package 2 Amount (Rs) Interest rate Payback 
period 
collateral 
 0.2 Million 17.00% 2years 3 acres land 
 
Package 3 Amount (Rs) Interest rate Payback 
period 
collateral Payback 
installment 
(per year) Rs. 
 0.2 Million 10.00% 2 year 3 acres land  Rs. 0.11 million 
 
Package 4 Amount (Rs) Interest rate Payback 
period 
collateral Number of 
persons in a 
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Group 
 0.2 Million 10.00% 2years ---- 4 
 
 
Offers Your preferences 
Package  1 vs  Package  2  
Package  1 vs  Package  3  
Package  1 vs  Package  4  
Package  2 vs  Package  3  
Package  2 vs  Package  4  
Package  3 vs  Package  4  
 
6. COMMENTS: 
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